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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Price Regulation-Rationale of "Affected
With a Public Interest"
The United States Supreme Court in Olsen v. Nebraska- swept
away the remaining vestige of the confusing notion that legislative price
fixing could only be exercised in businesses found by the Court to be
"affected with a public interest". The Court upheld, against an attack
founded on the due process clause, a Nebraska statute which provided
that no licensed employment agency should collect from an applicant,
as compensation for its services, more than the aggregate of a stated
registration fee and 10% of the first month's wages. 2 The Supreme
Court of Nebraska had held this legislation unconstitutional, 3 basing
their decision on Ribnik v. McBride,4 in which case the United States
Supreme Court had declared a similar New Jersey statute invalid. However, in the instant case, the Court, in reversing the state court, unequivocally stated,5 (1) that the Ribnik case had been overruled by
more recent decisions; (2) "that the phrase 'affected with a public
interest' can mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason,
is subject to control for the public good", and (3) that the wisdom,
need and appropriateness of such legislation "should be left where it
was left by the Constitution-to the states and to Congress".
The power to regulate business or economic activity for the general
welfare is inherent in any government. This regulatory power, known
as the police power, justifies the regulation of private enterprise when
necessary for the protection and promotion of the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare. The Fifth Amendment, controlling federal
action, and the Fourteenth, controlling state action, serve as limits for
the exercise of the police power. They confine the exercise of the
police power to its proper ends and insure that the ends shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process. In determining whether
price-fixing regulation. was within the objectives of the police power0
'61 Sup. Ct. 862, 85 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 820 (1941).
'NEB. Comp. STAT. (1929) §§48-508.
'State v. Kinney, 138 Neb. 574, 293 S.W. 393 (1940).
'277 U. S.350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L. ed. 913 (1927).
'Olsen v. Nebraska, 61 Sup. Ct. 862, 865, 85 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 820, 824
(1941).
' It is not within the scope of this note to discuss those instances where price
regulations have been upheld on some basis other than the conclusion that the
business involved was "affected with a public interest", e.g., Margolin v. United
States, 269 U. S. 93, 46 Sup. Ct. 64, 70 L. ed. 176 (1925), upholding statute
limiting amount chargeable by attorneys prosecuting various claims against the
United States; and Griffith v. State of Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563, 31 Sup. Ct.
132, 54 L. ed. 1151 (1910), sustaining a state usury statute.
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the courts until recently treated the right of the owner of property to
fix the price at which his property could be sold or used as an inherent
attribute of the property itself.7 Accordingly some special circumstances
had to exist in order to justify price regulation under the police power.
Commonly where the regulation was upheld the Court drew from the
circumstances the conclusion that the business was "affected with a public interest"." No such conclusion was necessary in order to justify
many other types of police regulation; for example, health regulations
could be visited upon enterprises whether or not they were "affected
with a public interest".9 However, health regulation is used to attack
health problems. Hitherto it was thought that price regulation was
supportable only where there were special price problems. The judicial
requirement that a business be "affected with a public interest", i.e., be
in a special category, before price regulation was justified, was the
judicial counterpart of the economic doctrine of laissez faire. The economic system was founded on free enterprise; price regulation was an
exception requiring justification.
Looking solely to the phraseology of the courts the term "'affected
with a public interest"' 0 eludes the grasp. The Supreme Court, by Mr.
Justice Sutherland, conceded that it was undefined and indefinite." Its
actual effect can best be understood, so far as price legislation is concerned, by examining the situations in which the Court found the enterTyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 429, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. ed. 718, 722
(1927).
' German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612,
58 L. ed. 1011 (1914); Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468, 36
L. ed. 247 (1892) ; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77 (1876).
Maryland v. Hyman, 98 Md. 596, 57 Atl. 6 (1904) (a statute prescribing at
least 400 cubic feet of air for each employee in manufacturing establishments
was upheld) ; People v. Smith, 108 Mich. 527, 66 N. W. 382 (1896) (statute
requiring blowers to carry dust from emery wheels).
" This phrase originated in Lord Hale's essay De Portibus Maris written
in 1670. Discussing the common law duty to charge reasonable prices imposed
on owners of wharves to which all must come, he remarked that, "When private
property is 'affected with a public interest' it ceases to be juris privati only".
In attempting to clarify its distinction between those businesses subject to price
regulation and those not so subject the Court in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 133,
24 L. ed. 77 (1876), referred to Lord Hale's essay and concluded that prices
could be regulated when a business was "affected with a public interest". However, it did not clearly decide whether the classification would be left to the
legislature or to the court; subsequent cases held that the court should make this
decision. In Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262
U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. ed. 1103 (1923), the Court limited businesses
"affected with a public interest" to three categories: (1) Where a franchise
had been granted, with an affirmative duty of rendering public service. (2)
Occupations long subject to exceptional regulations, such as innkeepers and
cabmen. (3) Those businesses, not public at their inception, which have come
to bear such a peculiar relation to the public that they can be said to have
been devoted by their owners to a public use, in effect granting the public an
interest in that use, and subject to regulation to the extent of that use.
" Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 430, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. ed. 718, 722
(1927).
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prises involved to be so affected. An examination of the decisions in
which the "affected with public interest" doctrine has been applied, and
the price regulation upheld, discloses that the element common to all
is the existence of a situation or a combination of circumstances materially impairing the regulative force of competition to the extent that
serious economic consequences resulted to a very large number of the
community.
The decision in Munn v. Illinois'2 is dearly explainable on the above
basis. There the Court was asked to review an Illinois statute which
fixed the maximum price for storage in grain elevators in Chicago. In
deciding that the grain elevators were "affected with a public interest"
the Court found that because of their strategic location between rail
traffic from the interior states and water traffic to the consumer world,
these elevators stood in the "gateway of commerce". It also found that
the owners had taken advantage of this strategic position and had
formulated a single-price schedule which was followed by all, thereby
creating a "virtual monopoly" affecting the whole wheat-producing middle west. Thus it was apparent to the Court that the competitive system
had broken down and that prices were no longer regulated by the law
of supply and demand. Consequently, because of this combination of
circumstances a business, private at its inception, had become "affected
with a public interest".
Subsequent cases in which price regulations have been upheld on
the "affected with public interest" theory have presented situations in
which the basic economic facts were the same as above, i.e., there had
been a breakdown of the competitive price-fixing system in a business
which affected the community as a whole. Thus a Kansas statute fixing
the rates of fire insurance companies was upheld.' 3 The facts were
that there was an almost universal need for insurance protection, and
that while the insurers competed for the business they all 'fixed their
premiums for similar risks according to an agreed schedule of rates.
Similar economic situations were presented in those cases where
price fixing was upheld because some emergency had caused the law of
supply and demand to become inoperative as a price regulator. 14 In
1294 U. S.133, 24 L. ed. 77 (1876).
" German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612,

58 L. ed. 1011 (1914). This decision was subsequently used as the basis for upholding a New Jersey statute fixing the commission of insurance agents. O'Gorman
and Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,. 282 U. S. 251, 51 Sup. Ct. 130, 75
L. ed. 324 (1930). It was also followed in LaTourteet v. McMaster, 248 U. S.
465, 39 Sup. Ct. 160,, 63 L. ed. 362 (1918) (where regulation of the relation of
those engaged in the insurance business was allowed).
14 War emergency rent statutes were upheld in: Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair,
264 U. S. 543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405, 68 L. ed. 841 (1924) ; Marcus Brown Holding Co.
v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465, 65 L. ed. 877 (1921) ; Block v.
Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. ed. 865 (1921).
Highland v. Russell Car and Snowplow Co., 279 U. S. 253, 49 Sup. Ct. 314, 73
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Block v. Hirsch,15 the first of a series of war emergency rent cases, the
power of Congress to fix rents was upheld in the presence of an abnormal demand and a limited supply of housing facilities.
On the other hand, certain cases are apparently inconsistent with
the above-mentioned rationale. Brass v. Stoeser 8 involved a North
Dakota statute regulating charges of some six hundred grain elevators
scattered along lines of railroad throughout a sparsely populated region.
There was no strangling monopoly and no indication that the regulative
power of competition had broken down, yet the legislation was upheld.
This can be defended on the basis that when a business is found to be
affected with a public interest all units of it are to be put in the same
classification though some of them lack the distinguishing characteristics
which originally had been used to justify the classification. Grain
elevators had already been held subject to price regulation in the Munt
case. But in Ribnik v. McBrideT the Court failed to declare a public
interest in a case involving the requisite economic factors. In that case
a six-to-three decision declared unconstitutional a New Jersey statute
fixing the maximum fees chargeable by employment agencies. 18 In this
business also the price control could have been justified on the ground
that free competition failed to fix prices adequately because in practice
the agencies took advantage of the unequal bargaining power of the
unemployed.
Comparison of the Brass and Ribnik cases discloses the unsatisfactory operation of the "affected with a public interest" test. In the first
case price regulation was supported where there was complete freedom
of competition and little apparent need for regulation; in the second,
regulation was invalidated in spite of the exceptional need for it.
Gradually various members of the Court became dissatisfied with
the old concept, as is evidenced by the presence in some of the more
recent decisions of vigorous dissents. Criticizing the majority in Tyson
v. Banton 9 Justice Holmes was of the opinion that "the notion that a
business is clothed with a public interest and has been devoted to a
public use" was "little more than a fiction intended to beautify what is
L. ed. 688 (1928) (emergency regulation of coal prices was sustained) ; Wilson
v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L. ed. 755 (1916) (federal emergency
wage regulation was upheld).
"256 U. S.135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. ed. 865 (1921).
"153 U. S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct. 857, 38 L. ed. 757 (1894).
27277 U. S.350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L. ed. 913 (1927).
LAws OF NEW JERSEY (1918) c. 277, p. 822.
273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. ed. 718 (1927) (the Court was asked
to pass on the validity of a New York statute limiting the resale price of theatre
tickets by ticket brokers. It was held that the theatre business was essentially
private in nature and therefore was not subject to price regulation; by treating
the theatre ticket brokers as an appendage of the theatre business it necessarily
followed that their charges could not be regulated).
"
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disagreeable to the sufferers", and further that "the proper course is to
recognize that a state legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless
it is restrained by some express prohibition.... Courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by
reading into them conceptions of public policy that the particular Court
may happen to entertain". 20 In the same case Justice Stone (dissenting)
attempted to give reality to previous decisions by saying that in all those
cases where price fixing had been upheld there had been a breakdown
of the "regulative force of competition" affecting seriously "a large
number of the members of the community". He insisted that a similar
situation existed in this case, and concluded that the solution to the
problem "turns upon considerations of economics about which there may
be reasonable difference of opinion. Choice between these views takes
us from the judicial to the legislative field. The judicial function ends
when it is determined that there is a basis for legislative action in a field
not withheld from legislative power by the Constitution as interpreted
21
by the decisions of this Court".
Justice Stone again dissenting in the Ribnik case added another
criticism of the "affected with a public interest" view, saying that he
could not distinguish a difference between "reasonable regulation of
price, if appropriate to the evil to be remedied, and other forms of
appropriate regulation" since either affected the economic return of a
business. 22 Justice Brandeis, dissenting in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,23 was of the opinion that "the notion of a distinct category of
business 'affected with a public interest' employing property devoted to
a public use rests upon historical error ...

the true principle is that the

State's power extends to every regulation of any business reasonably
required and appropriate for the public protection".
As a result of their efforts, in 1929 these dissenters seem to have
won a "moral victory" in Tagg Brothers v. Uited States. 24 That
decision, written by Justice Brandeis, unanimously upheld the validity
of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture fixing the maximum fees
chargeable by marketing agencies or commission men operating in the
Omaha Stockyards, which order was made pursuant to authority granted
to the Secretary in the Packers and Stockyards Act.25

The Court

simply stated that the commission men enjoyed a substantial monopoly
" Id. at 446, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 41 L. ed. at 729 (1927).
" Id. at 454, 47 Sup. Ct. at 436, 71 L. ed. at 733 (1927).
2'277 U. S. at 373, 48 Sup. Ct. at 552, 72 L. ed. at 923 (1927).
23285 U. S. at 302, 52 Sup. Ct. at 383, 76 L. ed. at 766 (1931) (a statute making a certificate of public necessity and convenience a prerequisite of engaging in
the business of manufacturing and distributing ice was held invalid).
" 280 U. S.420, 50 Sup. Ct. 220, 74 L. ed. 524 (1930).
" Act of Aug. 15, 1921, c. 64, §§301-16, 42 Stat. 159, 163-68, 7 U. S. C.
§§201-17 (1926).

88
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and performed an indispensable service in the interstate commerce in
livestock, and left undiscussed the question of whether or not the business was "affected with a public interest", even though they could have
decided the case on this basis. The Court appeared ready to give the
phrase "affected with a public interest" a well-earned rest. However,
it was not until 1934 that the Court, in Nebbid v. New York, 20 finally
overthrow in toto the idea that price control legislation could act only
on businesses "affected with a public interest". This decision involved
a statute giving a milk control board power to fix minimum prices for
milk, and was based on the legislative finding that an emergency existed
due to the oversupply of raw milk; therefore, the control of price
through the law of supply and demand was no longer effective. Moreover, the circumstances were such that if the Court had desired to do
so they could have upheld the statute either on the authority of the
emergency rent cases or by declaring the milk industry "affected with a
public interest", since competition had failed to fix a fair price and the
industry was of vast public importance. Instead of this, the majority
chose to abandon the laissez-faire idea that price regulatiorn would be
permitted only in those exceptional cases in which the Court found the
business or industry "affected with a public interest". The arguments
used in upholding the statute were those which had previously appeared
only in dissenting opinions and the conclusion reached was that the
phrase "affected with a public interest" meant only that the business so
described was, for adequate reasons, subject to control for the public
good. Commenting at the time on the decision, James E. Beck declared
that the Court had "calmly discarded its decisions of fifty years" without even paying "those decisions the obsequious respect of a final
oration".2 7.

That the Supreme Court had abandoned the old method of reviewing
price regulations should have been apparent to all in the Nebbia case. In
subsequent decisions the Court has followed the new approach in approving fair trade acts (which are analagous in requiring dealers to
observe minimum resale prices fixed in contracts to which they were not
parties),28 Federal milk price fixing,29 minimum wages, 30 and state regulation of tobacco warehouse charges. 3 1 However, in the face of these
26291 U. S.

502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. ed. 940 (1934).
at 5480.

" Cong. Rec., March 24, 1934,
28 Old Dearborn Distrib. Co.

v. Seagram Distillers Corp. 299 U. S. 183,
57 Sup. Ct. 139, 81 L. ed. 109 (1936).
" United'States v. Rock Royal Co6p., 307 U. S.533, 59 Sup. Ct. 993, 83
L. ed. 1446 (1939).
"oWest Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S.379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. ed.
703 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Childrens' Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43. Sup.
Ct. 394, 67 L. ed. 785 (1923), which had declared unconstitutional a minimum
wage statute applied to women).
" Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441, 57 Sup. Ct. 842, 81 L. ed. 1210
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decisions some authorities persisted in clinging to the old view. This
32
attitude appeared in the decision in the state court in the instant case.
The effect of the decision of the Supreme Court should be to make it
plain that its attitude in the Nebbia case is now its settled policy; that

hereafter price legislation need be justified by no special circumstances
under the label "affected with a public interest" or otherwise. This
decision is in line with recent trends toward a controlled economy, and

obviously makes it possible for governmental action to supplant free
competition as our principal means of determining prices. The new
approach will eliminate judicial legislation as to which businesses are
suitable for price control; yet by treating price fixing as an ordinary
exercise of the police power, a check against capricious and arbitrary

legislation will be preserved.

JAMEs

F.

LAWRENCE, JR.

Contempt of Court-Construction of Federal Statute Concerning
Punishment for Contempt
In the case of Nye v. United States,' the Supreme Court, by con2
struction of section 268 of the judicial code, has stringently abridged
3
the power of the federal district courts to punish summarily for
contempt.

4

(1937); Mayo v. 14keland Highlands Canning Co., Inc., 309 U. S. 310, 60 Sup.
Ct. 517, 84 L. ed. 481 (1940) (a preliminary injunction was denied against enforcement of a statute fixing prices of citrus juices in the citrus fruit industry).
State price regulation has been upheld in the following cases: Highland Farms
Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 608, 57 Sup. Ct. 549, 81 L. ed. 835 (1937);
Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 251, 56 Sup. Ct. 453, 80
L. ed. 669 (1936); Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163, 55 Sup.
Ct. 7, 79 L. ed. 259 (1934) ; cf. Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S.
266, 56 Sup. Ct. 457, 80 L. ed. 675 (1936) (the court held unreasonable and arbitrary a classification created by a N. Y. statute which limited the benefit of a
price differential to milk dealers not having a well-advertised trade name to those
who were already engaged in the milk business at a certain date).
'2 State v. Kinney, 138 Neb. 574, 293 S.W. 393 (1940).
'Nye v. United States, 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 733 (1941), Note
(1941) 54 HARv. L. Rav. 1397. Followed in Millinocket Theatre v. Kurston, 39
F. Supp. 979 (D. Me., 1941). Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F. (2d) 642 (App. D. C.
1941) (retroactive operation of Nye decision).
236 Stat. 1163 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §385 (1928) ("The said courts shall
have the power to impose and administer all necessary oaths, and to punish,
by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court, contempts of their
authority. Such power to punish contempts shall- not be construed to extend
to any cases except the misbehavior of any person in their presence, or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of
the officers of said courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any such officer, or by any party, juror, witness, or other person
to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts").
I As to bankruptcy proceedings, see Boyd v. Glucklick, 116 Fed. 131 (D.
Iowa, 1902). As to disobedience of an injunction outside the district, see Myers
v. United States, 264 U. S. 95, 44 Sup. Ct. 272, 62 L. ed. 577 (D. C. W. D.
Mo., 1924).
'This note will not deal with the constitutionality of the statute. The power
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E., administrator, brought a wrongful death action against B. and
C. in the federal district court for the middle district of North Carolina.
N., a son-in-law of one of the defendants in the wrongful death action,
and M., his tenant, brought E., an "illiterate, and feeble in mind and
body", from his home to a town at a considerable distance from the
middle district. N. and M. plied E. with liquor, and kept him in N.'s
home overnight. The next morning, when E. was sober, but still under
the influence of N. and M, they induced him to seek a termination of
the action. The letter to the district court was prepared by N.'s lawyer
and mailed by N. E. was not paid anything. The district court fined
N. and M., after summary proceeding, for contempt. The circuit court
of appeals upheld this decision, 5 but the Supreme Court reversed it on
the grounds that the acts were not misbehavior in the presence of the
court, "or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice"
within the meaning of s. 268 of the judicial code.
Ever since- Congress, in 1831, as the result of the acquittal of a
federal judge who punished summarily a critical newspaper editor,0
passed the ancestor of the present statute, limiting the power to punish
for contempt, the construction of the language used has been a judicial
problem of no mean proportions. On the one hand the courts are faced
with a loss of control over indirect contempts if they construe the statute
geographically; on the other hand, a cause and effect interpretation runs
afoul of the policy of strict construction of a criminal statute and of
the literal congressional language.
The Supreme Court has at various times used both tests. In cases
involving the influencing of a witness to disobey a subpoena7 and an
altercation with a judge after court had adjourned,8 for examples, the
Supreme Court has construed the language in question in a spatial
sense. But in cases involving the shadowing of a juror outside the
courthouse, 9 adverse criticism of the court in a pending matter, 10 an
of Congress to regulate contempts in the lower federal courts has long been
recognized. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42, 45 Sup. Ct. 18, 69 L.
ed. 162 (1924); Atwell v. United States, 162 Fed. 79 (C. C. A. 4th, 1908);
See article
Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510, 22 L. ed. 205, 207 (1874).
by Frankfurter and Landis, cited infra note 6.

'Nye

v. United States, 113 F. (2d)

(C. C. A. 4th, 1940), Note (1941)

19 N. C. L. REv. 219.
1 See STANSBURY,

REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK (1833)

; Ex parte

Shenck, 65 N. C. 354 (1871) ; Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over
Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in the
Separation of Powers (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 1010.
"Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 22 L. ed. 205 (1874).
'Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364, 19 L. ed. 214 (1869).
9
United States v. Sinclair, 279 U. S. 749, 49 Sup. Ct. 471, 73 L. ed. 938

(1929).
" Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560,
62 L. ed. 1186 (1918).
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attempt to influence a witness outside of the courtroom,1 an attempt
to influence a prospective juror before he was drawn,' 2 and lynching
a prisoner after an appeal had been allowed,13 the language was construed in a causal sense.
The lower federal courts have been equally confused. The bribing
of a witness, 14 service of a witness with a civil process after court had
adjourned,' 5 corrupting a juror,1 publication of a newspaper article
concerning a pending matter,17 and a letter written to a special assistant
attorney general charging the judge in a pending matter with bias,' S
have all been held to be contempt within the meaning of the statute,
even though the offense in each case originated at a point geographically
removed from the court. On the other hand, in cases involving a newspaper article about a pending matter,19 service of a writ of garnishment
on a witness during a recess of court," a letter to a litigant criticizing
the procedure in a pending matter,21 sale of assets by a bankrupt,2 2 and
wrongfully inducing a trustee in bankruptcy to pay out money,28 the
language of the statute was construed to deprive the court of jurisdiction
over such distant misconduct.
Oddly enough each of these decisions, including the principal caseno matter which of the views it upholds-seems to reach its conclusion
by reasoning along one or both of two lines. They seek to interpret the
history of the statute and to determine the legislative intent therefrom;
or they attempt to construe the words "so near thereto".
The court in the instant case, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas,
said: "Congress was responding to grievances arising out of the exerThe
cise of judicial power as dramatized by the Peck proceedings ....
two sections of the Act of March 2, 1831 . .. clearly indicate that the

category of criminal cases which could be tried without a jury was
24
narrowly confined".
1" Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267, 9 Sup. Ct. 703, 33 L. ed. 150 (1889).

Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 280, 9 Sup. Ct. 703, 33 L. ed. 150 (1889).
Sup. Ct. 165, 51 L. ed. 319 (1906).
United States v. Zavelo, 177 Fed. 536 (C. C. N. D. Ala., 1910).
" Kirk v. United States, 192 Fed. 273 (C .C. A. 9th, 1911).
"In re Independent Publishing Co., 240 Fed. 849, (C. C. A. 9th, 1917).
" Froelich v. United States, 33 F. (2d) 660 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
1" Ex parte Poulson, 19 Fed. Cas. 1205, No. 11,350 (C. C. E. D. Pa., 1835)
(the first case decided construing the Act of 1831); Morse v. Montana Ore
Purchasing Co., 105 Fed. 337 (C. C. D. Mont., 1900).
'oEx
parte Schulenberg, 25 Fed. 2il (C. C. E. D. Mich., 1885).
1
Hillman v. Insurance Co., 79 Fed. 749 (C. C. D. Kan., 1897).
" In re Probst, 205 Fed. 512 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1913).
"Morgan v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 830 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
-' Nye v. United States, 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 815, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 733 (1941);
see, 1 KE:NT'S COMMENTARIES (11th ed. 1867) 301, n.; Frankfurter and Landis,
Power of Congress Over Procedure in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Stdy in
the Separation of Powers (1924) 37 HARv. L. Rzv. 1010, 1031; Nelles and King,
Contempt By Publication (1928) 28 CALIF. L. REv. 525.
" United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563, 27
1 In re Brule, 71 Fed. 943 (D. Nev., 1895).
15
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The opposite view is typified by the statement of District Judge
Jones :25 "It is doubtful, to say the least of it, whether any of the
eminent lawyers in the Congress which adopted this provision ... had
in mind anything more than to prevent the punishment, as for contempt,
of the exercise of the right of free speech and liberty of the press in
26
criticizing and denouncing judicial acts".
When judicial interpretations of the clause "misbehavior . . . in
their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of
justice" are looked at, an equally wide divergence of attitudes is seen.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in the instant case, said: "The question is, whether
the words 'so near thereto' have a geographical or causal connotatidn.
Read in their context, and in the light of their ordinary meaning, we
conclude that they are to be construed as geographical terms".2 7 But
Mr. Chief Justice White, in the Toledo Newspaper case,28 said, "The
test, therefore, is the character of the act done, and its29direct tendency
to prevent and obstruct the discharge of judicial duty".
It is submitted, however, that in the instant decision the court need
not have responded to either of these arguments. The coerced letter
seeking dismissal of the action was received by the court in the middle
district. It was the fulfillment of a chain of acts, all intended to obstruct
the administration of justice. No part of the operation would have
been effective unless the letter had been received by the court. The
Supreme Court might have applied the doctrine of constructive presence
as enunciated in the criminal law; i.e., that an act is committed at the
place where it takes effect.30 The pr9ceedings in question were for
criminal and not civil contempt.
In the light of this unsettled state of the law, the court seems to
have based its decision on grounds of policy. It was apparently moved
by the thought that it would be more compatible with democratic insti2

Ex parte McLeod, 120 Fed. 130, 137 (D. Ala. 1903).
" United States v. Huff, 206 Fed. 700 (S. D. Ga., 1913); Kirk v. United
States, 193 Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 9th, 1911); United States v. Anonymous, 21
Fed. 61 (C. C. W. D. Tenn., 1884).
2' Nye v. United States, 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 815, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 733
(1941). See, Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, 422, 38
Sup. Ct. 560, 565, 62 L. ed. 1186 (1918) (Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting) ; Cuyler
v. Atlantic & N. C. Ry., 131 Fed. 95 (C. C. E. D. N. C., 1904). See supra
notes 7, 8, 9, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.
28 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560,
62 L. ed. 1186 (1918).
" Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, 419, 38 Sup. Ct.
560, 564, 62 L. ed. 1186 (1918) ; United States v. Craig, 206 Fed. 230 (S. D. N.
See supra
Y., 1920); McCaulley v. United States, 25 App. D. C. 404 (1905).
notes 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.
"0 In re Independent Publishing Co., 240 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917);
Keeney v. United States, 17 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927) ; accord, Snow v.
This point was raised in the
Hawkes, 183 N. C. 365, 111 S. E. 621 (1922).
Brief for the United States, p. 40, Nye v. United States, 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 85
L. ed. Adv. Ops. 733 (1941).
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tutions to insure to the accused in such cases jury trial and the other
protections afforded by criminal prosecution. Thus, the court says: "If
petitioners can be punished for their misconduct, it must be under the
criminal code, where they will be afforded the normal safeguards surrounding criminal prosecutions". 3'
There are, however, countervailing considerations, as pointed out by
Mr. Justice Stone (now Mr. Chief justice Stone) in the dissent. 32 The
criminal process is slow and cumbersome and likely to be defeated by
sundry interferences. The danger of judicial tyranny in summary contempt proceedings is less than the danger that a weakened judiciary will
be unable to protect its litigants against outside obstructions of justice.
It is therefore urged that Congress amend the statute. Unless this action
is taken such offenses as trial by newspaper of pending causes and noncorrupt influencing of witnesses and jurors will, under the present ruling, escape punishment altogether, either as contempts or as crimes.
FRED R. EDNEY, JP.
Elections-Federal Laws Applied to Primaries
Defendants, election officials, were charged with having altered,
falsely counted and certified the returns of ballots cast in a Democratic
primary election in Louisiana. The primary was held for nomination
of a candidate for Representative in Congress. By Louisiana law no
candidate unsuccessful in the primary could receive any votes in the
general election, "write-in" votes for such persons being disqualified
as having been cast for an ineligible candidate. 1 Because of these laws
and the one party character of Louisiana politics, the outcome of the
Democratic primary has always been tantamount to election. Indictments were secured under statutes providing penalties for injury or
oppression of any citizen in the free exercise of rights secured to
him by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Held: (1) Congress has the power to control fraud in such a primary election, and
(2) it had exercised that power through Sections 192 and 203 of the
4
Criminal Code, under which the indictments were secured.
" Nye v. United States, 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 817, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 733.

" See, Nye v. United States, 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 818, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 733
(1941) (Mr. Justice Stone dissenting: "The question is important, for if conduct such as the record discloses may not be dealt with summarily the only
recourse of a federal court for the protection of integrity of proceedings pending before it, from acts of intimidation and corruption outside the court room,
is to await the indictment of the offender, with or without adjournment of the
pending proceedings as the exigencies of the case might require").
1

Serpas v. Trebucq, (La. app.) 1 So. (2d) 346 (1941) ; rehearing denied with

opinion, 1 So. (2d) 705 (1941).
2R. S.§5508; c. 321, §19, 35 Stat. 1092; 18 U. S. C. A. §51 (1927).

3R. S.§5510; c. 321, §20, 35 Stat. 1092; 18 U. S. C. A. §52 (1927).
'United States v. Classic, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 867 (1941).
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The second section of Article 1 of the Constitution provides that
the House of Representatives shall be "composed of members chosen
every second year by the people of the several States... ." The fourth
section of Article 1 further provides that, "The times, places, and
manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to
the places of choosing Senators." 5
Manifestly these sections invest Congress with power to control
general federal elections. 6 This power is recognized to be restricted
only in the sense that Congress has permitted the states to regulate
federal elections held within their borders. 7 It was long tacitly assumed
that the power of Congress to control elections if it saw fit did not
extend to primaries. The question was expressly reserved 8 until presented to the Supreme Court in Newberry v. United States in 1921.0
Federal legislation purporting to regulate primaries as well as general
elections was declared unconstitutional. 10 But in the instant case the
court unanimously asserts the Congressional power to regulate primaries
involving a federal office where by state law the primary is constituted
an integral part of the election or, as a practical matter, almost invariably
controls the outcome of the general election.1 1
In the Newberry case the issue was directly presented by indictment
under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act.1 2 The court divided four to
four, a ninth judge reserving his opinion on the Congressional power
over primaries under the Seventeenth Amendment but declaring the

I U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XVII providing for popular election of Senators instead
of appointment by the various state legislatures eliminates any distinction between
Senators and Representatives as to the question of federal control of elections.
'Devoe v. United States, 103 F. (2d) 584 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939); Ex parte
Coy, 127 U. S.731, 8 Sup. Ct. 1263, 32 L. ed. 274 (1888) ; Ex parte Yarbrough,
110 U. S. 651, 4 Sup. Ct. 152, 28 L. ed. 274 (1884) ; Ex parte Clarke, 100 U. S.
399, 25 L. ed. 715 (1879); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 25 L. ed. 717
(1879).
7Lackey v. United States, 107 F. 114 (C. C. A. 6th, 1901) ; Ex parte Siebold,
100 U. S. 371, 25 L. ed. 717 (1879); for collected cases see Note (1902) 53
L. R. A. 660.
' Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 39 Sup. Ct. 468, 63 L. ed. 979 (1919);
United States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S.476, 37 Sup. Ct. 407, 61 L. ed. 857 (1917);
affirming United States v. O'Toole, 236 F. 993 (D. C. S. D. W. Va. 1916).
oNewberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232, 41 Sup. Ct. 489, 65 L. ed. 913
(1921); Notes (1921) 92 CENT. L. J. 445, (1922) 22 CoL. L. J. 54, (1921) 19
MicH. L. REV. 860.
"0Federal Corrupt Practices Act, c. 392, 36 Stat. 822-824 (1910); c. 33, 37
Stat. 25-29 (1911) (regulation of primary and general election campaign expenditures).
" The words "primaries" and "elections" as used in this note apply only
to those primaries or elections where a federal office is involved. There will be
no mention of primaries or elections other than these.
2 See supra note 10.
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Act unconstitutional in that it was passed before the Amendment was
ratified.' 3 The otherwise even division of the court was rooted in the
philosophical question of whether the above-mentioned sections of
Article 1 of the Constitution were grants of power from individual states
to the Federal Government, or from the Federal Government to the
states. Four justices considered Article 1, Sections 2 and 4 as grants
to the states of part of the inherent power of the Federal Government,
and therefore urged that powers not granted (over primaries) were
reserved to the granting government. Moreover, that the Constitution
should not be narrowly construed, but rather that the word "elections"
in the latter -section should be recognized as including any process or
phase in the designation of representatives by popular choice. The
remaining four justices maintained conversely that the Federal Government could control elections only in so far as the power was directly
conferred by Article 1, Section 4. For, as they urged, this being a
grant of power from the states, no implied or inherent power could
be said to exist outside of the technical words of the grant. The
framers of the Constitution had no knowledge of primaries and therefore they must have intended the term "elections" to apply only to the
final act in the designation of the officeholder. These justices considered
it immaterial that the primary might have a pronounced effect on the
outcome of the general election.
Admirably, the court in the instant case, faced only with the complete diversity of opinion in the Newberry case, acted as a whole in
deciding that Congress did have the power in question. Following closely the ideas of one bloc of justices in the Newberry case, the court
reasoned as follows: Article 1, Section 4, as a grant from the Federal
Government to the states, expressly reserves to Congress the power to
regulate the manner of holding "elections". This power is not lost
by permitting the states to split their federal elections into two or more
steps, nor is its application in any way limited to the final step in such
elections. The Louisiana primary, statutes having eliminated defeated
primary candidates from the general election and in effect made the
primary an integral part of the election, 14 was an "election" within
the meaning of the term as used in Article 1, Section 4, and is therefore
subject to Congressional regulation. However, the court id not stop
at that point but went on to base their decision on grounds more fundamental in political philosophy: Article 1, Section 2 provides that Representatives shall be "chosen . . . by the people. . . ." As a practical
matter the choice of Representative in Louisiana is always made in the
I, See supra note 5.
14 La. Act No. 46, Regular Session, 1940, §87; Serpas v. Trebucq, 1 So. (2d)
346 (1941), rehearing denied with opinion 1 So. (2d) 705 (1941).
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Democratic party primary-the election being a mere formality ratifying the results of the primary. Such being the case, Congress should
be permitted to see to it that Representatives are in fact "chosen" by
the people, and to protect the integrity of the step in which actual
choice is made, as well as the final step which only confirms that choice.Yr
A further question presented to the court in the instant case was:
Conceeding the power of Congress to maintain the integrity of the
Louisiana primary, has it exercised this authority by appropriate legislation? Sections 19 and 2016 of the Criminal Code are the only applicable statutes.1 7 The former section penalizes acts of conspiracy to injure
and oppress any citizen in the free exercise of rights "secured to him
by the Constitution or laws of the United States." During its history
the rights to testify before a land office,' 8 to be secure in federal custo1This
recognition of the political potency of the primary in one party states
undermines the status of the notorious Texas racial discrimination cases. In
Texas the political party is not supported by state funds or connected with state
control. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45, 55 Sup. Ct. 622, 79 L. ed. 1292
(1935) therefore found the party to be a purely private organization and, as such,
able to prescribe any qualifications it deemed expedient for membership or participation in the primary. The Democratic party in Texas found it advisable to
permit only white voters to take part in the primary. Since the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments prohibiting racial discrimination do not apply to the acts
of purely private individuals or organizations the Grovey case allowed this arbitrary exclusion of negroes. Though the Texas primary has not been constituted
an integral part of the election by law, its practical effect is the same as in
Louisiana. In Texas the Democratic nomination is always tantamount to election. Unfortunately, the terrific practical significance of the primary failed to
influence the decision. As a result the negro was almost completely disfranchised
in Texas. The instant case considers such a primary of sufficient public importance
to warrant its subjection to federal control, even though it is not conducted in connection with state laws. With proper application of this decision the Texas
negro will get his vote back, at least in federal elections. Notes (1935). 35 CoL.
L. REv. 106, (1935) 2 U. OF Cm. L. Rlv. 640, (1935) 48 HARv. L. REV. 1436,
(1935) 33 MIcH. L. Ray. 935, (1935) 22 VA. L. RaV. 91.
"6Originally R. S. §5508 (Act May 31, 1870, c. 116, 16 Stat. 141) and R. S.
§5510 (Act May 31, 1870, c. 116, 16 Stat. 144). Repealed (1909) c. 321, §341,
35 Stat. 1153. Reenacted without significant change (1909) c. 321, §19, 35 Stat.
1092, and (1909) c. 321, §20, 35 Stat. 1092, 18 U. S. C. A. §§51 and 52. Originally
passed as part of extensive Reconstruction legislation to protect the civil rights
of the then recently freed negroes, these statutes were left in force when the
other sections were repealed in 1894. See United States v. Bathgate, 246 U. S.
220, 225, 38 Sup. Ct. 269, 270, 62 L. ed. 676, 679 (1918) ; United States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476, 483, 37 Sup. Ct. 407, 410, 61 L. ed. 857, 863 (1917) ; United
States v. Moseley, 238 U. S. 383, 388, 35 Sup. Ct. 904, 906, 59 L. ed. 1355, 1357
(1915) (dissenting opinion). The applicable portion of §20 punishes the same
acts which are prohibited under §19 when they are perpetrated under color of
law. Although the last portion of §20 applies specifically to racial discrimination,
it was held in the instant case that the first clause extends protection to all
classes of citizens. Both sections protect the same rights; i.e., those secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, and statutory construction seems
identical as to whether or not the particular privilege is in fact protected.
" Though both sections protect rights secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States they themselves are the only laws in point with the offense
alleged. The Hatch Act, c. 410, §1, 53 Stat. 1147, 18 U. S. C. A. §61, et seq.,
does not regulate primaries in this respect, and applies only to persons or organizations receiving federal funds.
" Foss v. United States, 266 F. 881 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920).
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to inform officers of the commission of a federal crime, 20 to prove

up a federal homestead, 21 to be free from involuntary servitude, 22 to
enforce obedience to a decree of a federal court, 23 among others, have

been held to be secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and so to fall within the meaning and protection of the statute. 24 In
many of these cases the rights protected were founded on implication
from the Constitution and not secured by express words.25 Applying
the statute to elections, it has been held to protect the right to cast a
27
vote in a general election,2 6 and to have that vote counted as cast.
However, in Gradwdll v. United States, the court refused to extend
these decisions to a primary election and gave as their reason the fact
that the primary hadt only an indirect effect on the results of the general
election. 28 The theory of the court was that, regardless of the injury
to the public, the statute had no application where no definite personal
29
right had been invaded by the acts of the defendants.
The majority of the court in the principal case, in holding that Congress had exercised its power to control primaries through the above:'Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. 617, 36 L. ed. 429
(1892).
" Motes v. United States, 178 U. S. 458, 25 Sup. Ct. 993, 44 L. ed. 1150
(1900) ; In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 532, 15 Sup. Ct. 959, 39 L. ed. 1080 (1895).
United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76, 5 Sup. Ct. 35, 28 L. ed. 673 (1884).
22 Smith v. United State9, 157 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907).
"United States v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. 885 (C. C. W. D. Ga. 1890).
"For collected cases see Note (1937) 107 A. L. R. 1363.
2Nicholson v. United States, 79 F. (2d) 387 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) ; Hoffman
v. United States, 68 F. (2d) 101 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933) ; In re Quarles, 158 U. S.
532, 15 Sup. Ct. 959, 39 L. ed. 1080 (1895) (right to inform of crime) ; Foss v.
United States, 266 F. 881 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920) (right to testify) , Logan v.
United States, 144 U. S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. 617, 36 L. ed. 429 (1892) (right to be
secure in custody).
2" Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347,' 35 Sup. Ct. 926, 59 L. ed. 1340
(1915) (grandfather clause); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 4 Sup. Ct.
152, 28 L. ed. 274 (1884) (Ku Klux cases) ; United States v. Pleva, 66 F. (2d)
529 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933); Aczel v. United States, 232 Fed. 652 (C. C. A. 7th,
1916) ; Felix v. United States, 186 Fed. 685 (C. C. A. 5th, 1911).
2" United States v. Moseley, 238 U. S. 383, 35 Sup. Ct. 904, 59 L. ed. 1355
(1915) ; Deyoe; v. United States, 103 F. (2d) 584 (C. C. A.- 8th, 1939) ; United
States v. Clark, 19 F. Supp. 981 (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1937); Diulius v. United
States, 79 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935); Connelly v. United States, 79 F.
(2d) 373 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935); United States v. Pleva, 66 F. (2d) 529 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1933).
28 Gradwell v. United States, 243 U. S. 476, 37 Sup. Ct 407, 61 L. ed. 857
(1917), affirming United States v. O'Toole, 236 Fed. 993 (D. C. S. D. W. Va.
1916). Held: no injury to rights of primary candidates where persons unsuccessful in the primary could be nominated by certificate signed by at least five
percent of the entire vote polled at the last preceding general election. Notes
(1917) 31 HAv. L. Rav. 302, 313, (1917) 3 VA. L. REG. (n. s.) 131, (1917) 27
YALE L. J. 137.
20 United States v. Bathgate, 246 U. S. 220, 38 Sup. Ct. 269, 62
L. ed. 676
(1918) (bribery at general election held injury to public and no invasion of
personal rights); United States v. Kantor, 78 F. (2d) 710 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935)
(mere inclusion of disqualified votes without subtraction of votes already cast
held no invasion of personal rights).
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detailed section, was able to impliedly distinguish the Gradwell case
on the grounds that the Louisiana primary was an integral part of the
election. The court reasoned: Since this statute secured the right to
vote and to have ballots correctly counted in a general election, the acts
of defendants, if committed in a general election, would have been
within the statute. Since the primary before the court was an integral
step in the election and an indispensable part thereof, both by state
law and practical local politics, it followed that the false counting of
the primary ballots was an act within the purview of the statute.3 0
It was said that in view of the broad language of the statute its protection should not be denied merely because fraud in some primaries might
be no interference with a Constitutional right-implying that the statute
would not apply where the primary was not an integral part of the
election.
On this phase of the case the majority met with vigorous opposition.
The minority of the court pointed out the maxim that penal statutes
are to be strictly construed. 1 The statute in question was intended to
protect rights secured by the Constitution and therefore the court must
find more in the Constitution than the power to afford protection-it
must find the protection itself.3 2 Finally the dissent interpreted legislative intent as limiting the application of the statute to rights involved in
general elections only, because primaries were almost unknown when the
statute was passed 3 3 In rebuttal of the dissent it is tenable to argue
that, though penal statutes are to be construed in favor of the accused,
this rule is not strictly applied as was true in the old days when capital
offenses were common.3 4 Many rights have been protected by the
statute which were only impliedly secured by the Constitution. 8 Furthermore, regardless of legislative intent, even penal statutes have been
construed to cover everything subsequently falling within their scope.3 0
The principal objection to the conclusion that Sections 19 and 20
apply to offenses of the type charged in the instant case is seen in the
fact that this application seems dependent on the existence of the primary as an integral part of the election. In order to determine whether

there is any offense at all, the court must first determine that this is, in
"0The court did not pass on the rights of candidates to run for office and to
-have ballots cast in favor of their nomination counted as cast. See Morris v.
United States, 261 Fed. 275 (C. C. A. Ill. 1919) and stpra note 28.
"1United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 76, 105, 5 L. ed. 37, 45

(1820).
" United States v. Sanges, 48 Fed. 78 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1891).

Contra: Foss
v. United
States, 266 Fed. 881 (C. C. A. 9th., 1920).
3
See United States v. Moseley, 238 U. S. 383, 388, 35 Sup. Ct. 904, 906, 59
L. ed. 1355, 1357 (1917) (dissenting opinion).
" MAXWELL, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (6th ed. 1920) 462.
" See supra note 22.
" Browder v. United States, 312 U. S. 335, 61 Sup. Ct. 599, 85 L. ed. Adv.
Ops. 537 (1941); Note (1940) 9 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 234.
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fact, the status of the particular primary. Making the existence of the
crime, dependent on judicial research subsequent to the offense is highly
undesirable where the sovereign has no common law criminal jurisdiction.37 The accused has a right to be put on notice by statute as to
whether particular acts constitute a federal offense. Where there are
no laws making the primary an integral part of the election, fraud in the
primary of the dominant party, under the strict language of the principal case, would constitute a federal offense, whereas the same acts in
the primary of the minority party would not. The determination of
whether there was a federal offense would necessitate judicial research
into local laws and political customs-in effect, judicial legislation-in
every case presented. 38 The majority in the instant case dismissed this
seemingly powerful objection lightly by declaring that it presented a
difficulty inherent in the judicial application of every federal criminal
statute, since none could be extended beyond the limits prescribed by
the Constitution.
However, a finding that the legislation was inappropriate would
have made it unnecessary to pass on the question of Congressional power
to control primaries. If the question had remained undecided, as after
the Gradwell case, Congress might have hesitated to pass more specific
legislation of this nature for fear that it would be ruled unconstitutional
under the Newberry case. It is possible, therefore, that the majority
deemed itself compelled by reason of public necessity to "stretch an old
statute to new uses" in order to establish an unequivocal holding that
Congress had the power to control primaries involving federal offices.
Though the instant case settles the question of federal power to
control primaries which are an integral part of the election by law,
or are equivalent to election by local custom, its future application may
present many problems. The court might deny the power of Congress
to regulate minority party primaries not integral parts of the election
by law. Such a view could be taken under the instant case by limiting
its authority to facts such as were there directly presented. A ruling
denying protection to minority party primaries would burden the courts
with determining whether any particular primary was of sufficient im"'United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch (U. S.) 32, 3 L. ed. 259 (1812)

common law offense against the United States).

(no

31Id. at 34, 3 L. ed. at 260 (act must be made a crime by statute) ; accord,
United States v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624, 628, 10 Sup. Ct. 625, 626, 33 L. ed.
1080, 1083 (1890) (acts must be plainly and unmistakably within criminal statute) ;
James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127, 23 Sup. Ct. 678, 47 L. ed. 979 (1903) ; United
States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 221, 23 L. ed. 563, 566 (1875) "It would certainly
be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent,
substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government." Also
see U. S. CoxsT. AMEND. VI.
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portance to warrant federal control. This determination would be
especially difficult in multi-party states. It seems evident that' even
the minority party primary has some effect on the general election.3 9
The extension of protection to primaries equivalent to election because of
the character of local politics, while 'denying protection to the minority
party primaries, might be arbitrary discrimination in violation of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.40 And
though one party may have dominated a state for many years, and so
brought its primaries under federal protection, a political upheaval
might put the other party in power and its candidates in office, even
though its primaries had not been under federal supervision. These
questions must be resolved by future legislation or judicial decree.
This decision, the court being divided four to three on the question of
statutory construction, stands in danger of being overruled unless more
definite laws are passed. Specific statutes would eliminate the idea of
judicial legislation and greatly lighten the burden which the instant
case places on the judiciary. Therefore it is submitted: (1) An appropriate Federal Primary Control Act should be enacted settling the
difficulties inherent in the application of the instant case. (2) Full
protection of the public in elections demands, in the event such legislation is passed, that the court shall not find it repugnant to the Constitution when applied to minority party primaries not integral parts of the
election by law, but shall take the further necessary step of holding that
federal control may extend to all primaries where a federal office is
involved.
JOHN T. KLPATRICK, JR.
Evidence-The Opinion Rule-Use of Hypothetical
Question as Basis of Expert Opinion
The P's intestate was thrown to the center of the highway when the
auto in which she was riding as a passenger failed to make a turn in
the road and struck a bridge abutment. One of the D motor lines'
trucks was immediately behind the car. P's contention is that the truck
ran over the girl's body, thereby contributing to her death. The D contends that its truck passed to the left of the prone figure. On trial, the
D motor lines offered testimony of a physician who had examined the
girl, and proposed to ask him the following question:
" See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney in Newberry v. United States,
256 U. S. 232, 275, 41 Sup. Ct. 469, 480, 65 L. ed. 913, 928 (1921).
"'Defendants raised this point in their petition for rehearing. (Rehearing
denied Oct. 14, 1941, 10 LAW WEEK 3125) ; Brief in support of petition for rehearing, p. 8, United States v. Classic, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031, 85 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 867
(1941).

1941]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

"Dr. T, from your examination of the body of Mildred Catherine Hester,
before her death, as you have testified, and the examination of the injuries such as you have found, do you have an opinion satisfactory to
yourself as to whether or not any of those injuries were caused by the
lody coming into contact with the Horton Motor Company's truck?"
The answer, as reported out of the hearing of the jury, was:
"I do not believe that any of her injuries were sustained by being struck
by the Horton Motor Lines' truck."
The trial judge excluded the question and answer, presumably on
the ground that it was opinion evidence invading the province of the
jury. Thereafter, the jury found for the P and rendered a substantial
verdict against the trucking concern, the driver of the truck, and the
driver of the wrecked car. On appeal by the D motor lines; held' that
the exclusion of the proposed question and answer constituted reversible
2
error.
The instant case raises two problems which will be dealt with in
this note: (1) The extent of the rule against invading the province of
the jury in cause and effect cases--cases where given a particular hurt,
expert opinion evidence is offered as to the contributing causes. (2) The
permissible wording of such a question, opinion evidence being
admissible.
Among the foremost of the exclusionary rules of evidence is the
so-called "opinion" .rule. The substance of it and the original foundation of the rule, to use Wigmore's terminology, is the requirement
of "Testimonial Knowledge". The witness must know from a factual
basis whereof he speaks, and must not be merely hazarding a guess.3
In addition, the rule is held to cover the inferences drawn by witnesses
who have had personal observation. 4 A recognized exception exists
where the witness has some special skill or experience which would aid
the tribunal in arriving at its conclusions from the operative facts and
the subject is one that requires special knowledge, skill, experience, or
training.5 However, there has been a tendency to limit the scope of
this exception by, in turn, grafting an exception on it. That is, American courts have shown an inclination to 'exclude even the opinion of
expert witnesses, on the issue or issues which ultimately go to the jury.6
'Hester v. Motor Lines, 219 N. C. 14 S. E. (2d) 794 (1941).
2 Even though, previously, the Doctor was permitted to testify that the girl's
injuries were produced by her striking the concrete roadbed.
'2 WIGMoRE, EvIDENcE (3d. ed. 1923) §§657, 557. RESTATEMENT, CODE oF
EVIDENCE: (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1933) §501.
'WIGmOm, EViDENCE (student's Textbook 1935) §127.
RESTATEMENT, CODE OF EVIDENCE (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1933) §502; 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) 557; State v. Hightower, 187 N. C. 300, 121
S. E. 616 (1926); State v. Bowman, 78 N. C. 509 (1878).
'Keefe v. Amour & Co., 258 Ill. 28, 101 N. E. 252 (1913); Yost v. Conroy,
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The theory followed is that such testimony would usurp the function
of the jury.
While it is difficult to harmonize the decision in this state where the
jury-province rule has been applied, the North Carolina court has consistently paid lip service to it. Our court, however, in a majority of
the cases, has indicated that the rule's objection is avoided (and expert
opinion evidence is admissible) : (1) If the opinion is based upon facts
admitted or found, as contrasted with facts which are controverted ;7
(2) if all the surrounding facts are known to the expert from personal
observation ;8 or (3) if, where the facts are controverted, the opinion is
presented as the answer to a hypothetical question, even though the
question may present the identical problem as the ultimate issue for the
jury.9
In the cases placed by the court in the third category, a considerable
emphasis is directed to the wording of the hypothetical question.10 It
92 Ind. 464 (1883); United States v. Steadman, 73 F. (2d) 704 (C. C. A. 10th,

1934).
See, Summerlin v. Carolina & N. W. R. Co., 133 N. C. 550, 555, 45 S. E.
898, 900 (1903) where the court suggested that even in this instance the question
should be hypothetical because the jury must still pass upon the credibility of
the witness.
' At this point the cases are difficult to follow. The proposition was dearly
sustained in the following cases: George v. Winston-Salem Southbound Ry., 215
N. C. 773, 95 S. E. 2d 373 (1939); Keith v. Gregg, 210 N. C. 802. 188 S. E.
849 (1936) ; Shaw v. National Handle Co., 188 N. C. 222, 124 S. E. 325 (1924) ;
Stpte v. Hightower, 187 N. C. 300, 121 S. E. 616 (1923) (the court did suggest
in this case that the better practice would have been to question the expert in hypothetical form) ; Ferebee v. Norfolk & So. Ry., 167 N. C. 290, 83 S. E. 360
(1914). But the distinction between cases where the court has required the use
of the hypothetical question and the cases above cited is slight. In each of the
cases cited in footnote 10 infra--cases where the hypothetical question was required-it is submitted that the expert based his opinion as much upon personally observed facts as the experts testifying in the cases listed here-category (2). What seems to bother thd court in these latter cases is not so much
whether the opinion was based upon observed facts, but whether the witness's
opportunity of observation sufficiently put him in command of the circumstances
that he should be permitted to give a definite opinion as to the producing cause
of the injury. This is to say that, if the expert did not examine the injured party
until a considerable time after the accident, such as was true in the Sumnierlin
case, 133 N. C. 550, 4S S. E. 898, there is a strong possibility thall other factors
could have produced or aggravated the injury. Apparently, the court wishes
this possibility of error brought -to the attention of the jury at the time the jury
receives the opinion.
- State v. Carr, 196 N. C. 129, 144 S. E. 698 (1928); Hill v. Louisville Ry.,
186 N. C. 475, 119 S. E. 884 (1923); Plummer v. Seaboard Airline, 176 N. C.
279, 96 S. E. 1032 (1918) ; Lynch v. Rosemary Mfg. Co., 167 N. C. 98, 82 S. E.
6 (1914) ; Herring v. Atl. Coastline Ry. Co., 160 N. C. 252, 74 S. E. 8 (1912) ;
Parrish v. High Point Ry. Co., 146 N. C. 125, 59 S. E. 348 (1907); State v.
Wilco3, 132 N. C. 1120, 44 S. E. 625 (1903) ; Summerlin v. Carolina & N. W. R.
Co., 133 N. C. 550, 45 S. E. 898 (1903); State v. Cole, 94 N. C. 959 (1886);
State v. Bowman, 78 N. C. 509 (1878).
" See particularly: Summerlin v. Carolina & N. W. R. Co., 133 N. C. 550,
45 S. E. 898 (1903); Parrish v. High Point Ry. Co., 146 N. C. 125, 59 S. E.
348 (1907) ; Herring v. Atl. Coastline Ry. Co., 160 N. C. 252, 74 S. E. 8 (1912);
State v. Bowman, 78 N. C. 509 (1878).
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is said that the question should contain a statement of facts which
might have been testified to by witnesses or which may be found by the
jury from the evidence." "The party propounding the question may,
it is true, so array the facts in the question as to present fully his contention in regard to them, provided there be evidence legally sufficient
to sustain a finding of them by the jury., The proper form of the question is: If certain facts assumed in the question to be established by
the evidence should be found by the jury, what would be the witness's
opinion upon the facts thus found of the matter involved and to which
the inquiry is directed ?''12 Some cases have stressed the point that the
question should conclude with a clause: "might these factors have produced this result",' 3 or "could the injury have been caused by these
factors".14 However, this requirement has not been consistently applied. In later cases, generally, the wording of the hypothetical question was examined less technically then in the earlier cases. 5
Judged by these standards, the action of the trial judge inthe principal case in excluding the question submitted was entirely correct, as
the record shows the question did not follow the prescribed lines, and
the issue of the truck striking P's intestate was a fundamental issue in
the case against the motor lines. However, it is submitted that the
position taken by the appellate court is the more sensible one.
The theory behind the use of the hypothetical question is sound. A
means is provided by which the trier of fact may determine the value
of the opinion by comparing and evaluating the facts in its premises
with the facts as ultimately found from all the evidence.' 6 Yet, sound
as it may seem theoretically, many abuses have been- committed in its
name. There is always a tendency on the part of the courts (this is
true in this state) 1 7 to adopt one form of wording as a formula-a
breach of which constitutes reversible error. In addition, clever lawyers often conceal the real significance of the evidence by unduly emphasizing certain data. Often they are able to distort the expert's opinion
in such a manner that his answer to a complicated question may not
express his actual opinion to the actual facts.' 8 Because of these abuses,
"I See note 12 infra.
12 Summerlin v. Carolina & N. W. R. Co., 133 N. C. 550, 45 S.E. 898 (1903).
Parrish v. High Point Ry. Co., 146 N. C. 125, 58 S. E. 348 (1907).
Herring v. Atl. Coastline Ry. Co., 160 N. C. 252, 74 S. E. 8 (1912). It is
submitted that this requirement springs from the same proposition as was discussed in footnote 9 supra.
2r The court has been more ready to say that an expert is basing his opinion
upon sufficient personal observation. George v. Winston-Salem Southbound Ry.
Co., 215 N. C. 773, 95 S. E. (2d) 373 (1939); Keith v. Gregg, 210 N. C. 802,
188 S. E. 849 (1936).
2
1"Rosenthal, Tire Development of the Use of Expert Testinony (1935)
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 403.
9
supra.
in
footnote
cited
cases
17 See
28 See 2 WIGmoRE, EviDENcE (3rd ed. 1940) §686.
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most authorities advocate that the expert witness be permitted to give
his opinion without the use of a hypothetical question.1 9 It is their contention that cross-examination could be successfully employed to bring
out the exact facts upon which the opinion is based, and that therefore
there is no need for posing a time-consuming hypothetical question as
a preliminary to the opinion.
As for the rule excluding evidence which the court deems as usurping the province of the jury, it seems unreasonable that the admissibility
of expert opinion should be dependent on any such meritless and nebulous standard. As pointed out in a previous case comment in this
REVIEW :20 "Evidence of the very point in issue would seem to be of the
highest pertinency. Thus a strict application of the rule leads to the
absurd result that admissibility varies in inverse proportion to relevancy". This policy is often defended in that it is said to be necessary
to prevent the jury from giving unmerited weight to such an opinion
instead of giving the question that independent consideration to which
a party is entitled in a jury trial. However, this argument is difficult
to follow for, by hypothesis, the subject is one with which the jury is incapable of dealing. It is submitted that a more productive approach
would be simply to ask whether, under the circumstances of the case,
the opinion would aid the jury in arriving at a sound decision.
E. W. COLE, JR.
Labor Law-Applicability of Anti-Racketeering Act to
Certain Practices of Labor Unions
Convicted under the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act, 1 defendant, a
truck drivers' union in New York City, appealed to the federal circuit
court.

Evidence was that the union sought to control all hauling in

New York City; that it posted members on the edge of the city, who
attempted to commandeer incoming trucks, drive them within the city,

and do any necessary loading and unloading; that various breaches of
the peace and acts of violence resulted when the truck operators re-

sisted the labor unions; that in most cases the union men exacted up
to $9.42 (a day's wages) from each incoming truck, regardless of the
length of time involved in driving or "standing by" ;2 and that the union
(3d ed. 1940) §686; RESTATEMENT, 'CODE OF Evi(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1933) §509; Tentative Draft of Model Expert Testimo ny Act, 11.
192 WIGmoRE, EvIDENcE

DENcE

"0Note (1938) 16 N. C. L. REv. 180.
'48 Stat. 979 (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. §420a-e (Supp., 1940).

'As the name implies, a stand-by is a local union member who is present at
a particular job-site and is paid a full salary, because of pressure exerted on
the employer by a labor union, but who does practically no work, due to the
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members probably would have done any and all the truck driving if
given a chance to. Held, that a logical and prudent interpretation of
the clause of the Anti-Racketeering Act which reads, "not including,
however, the payment of wages by a bona fide employer to a bona fide
employee", and also an examination of the legislative history of the
statute, lead to the conclusion that Congress intended thereby to exempt
labor disputes generally from the purview of the Act; and, this being a
labor dispute, defendant is not guilty of the violation charged, even
though its conduct is very questionable. 3
This case is by no means unique. Various contemporary writers
have gathered an alarming number of examples of "rackets" being
operated by labor unions. In most such cases force and violence are not
used, so that these unions are not subject to attack by injunction under
the Federal Anti-Injunction Act.4 Practically every exhibit at the
New York World's Fair was forced to pay tribute to the local unions
in the form of hiring stand-bys. Stand-bys had to be hired even for
extremely technical jobs which none of the local men possibly could
have done. Several workers sent as stand-bys for some noted mural
painters, turned out to be only house painters when unexpectedly asked
to do some work. 5 Painters' unions in various sections of our country
forbid the use of spray guns-'handbrush painting increases the time involved, and so proportionately the cost. 6 Because the local builders'
unions refuse to work with prefabricated materials, FHA records reveal
that, instead of more positions being created for carpenters, plumbers,
masons, and laborers, the number of homes constructed in Cleveland,
Ohio, for example, is greatly reduced.7 Chicago grocers, wishing to
pass on to the public the savings in delivery charges of cash-and-carry
milk, were prevented from so 'doing by the local milk-wagon drivers'
union. 8 In various parts of the country, union men will not work
under the direct supervision of the person having the work done, but
will force the hiring of many unneeded supervisors and "straw bosses". 9
Such examples could be cited almost ad infinitum, but it will suffice
to say that because of the very union under indictment in the principal
case, it costs $112.00 more to distribute a load of vegetables in New
fact that the employer uses his own previously employed workers even though
he 3has to pay. double for so doing.
United States v. Local 807 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Stablemen, and Helpers of America, 118 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 2d,
1941). Contra: Nick et al. v. United States, 122 F. (2d) 660 (C. C. A. 8th,
1941).
'47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §101-115 (Supp., 1940).
'Stanley High, Labor it the World of Tomorrow, Reader's Digest, Nov.,
1939.
Arnold, Labor's Hidden Holdup Men, Reader's Digest, June, 1941.
'Thurman
7
Ibid.
8Ibid.
'William Hard, Labor and National Unity, Reader's Digest, Nov., 1939.
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York than in other comparable cities. A farmer bringing in his own
produce on -his own truck must hire one of the stand-bys as the price
of unloading the truck.' 0
It is believed that the problem thus seen to exist is not adequately
dealt with by any of the existing labor acts, or any other federal statutes,
unless it is the Anti-Racketeering Act. A survey of the most important
labor legislation shows that in the last decade Congress has without
exception been affording increased powers and protection to labor. First,
the Norris-LaGuardia, or Federal Anti-Injunction Act outlawed the
"yellow dog" contract, thus eliminating the practice followed by many
employers of hiring only those workers who would sign a contract not
to join a union or engage in union activities; and also prevented the
abuse of the strike injunction by prohibiting the enjoining of peaceful
picketing, and strike practices not accompanied by force or violence.
Second, the Wagner, or National Labor Relations Act" guaranteed
the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively, provided
machinery for protection against unfair labor .practices of employers,
and provided that no employer could refuse to bargain collectively with
a bargaining unit for labor selected under the provisions of the Act.
Third, the Fair Labor Standards, or Wages and Hours Act 12 provides that wages shall be kept above a certain minimum; that hours
shall in the main be kept below a certain maximum, or that "time-and-ahalf" shall be paid for overtime; that no employee shall be discriminated against by his employer for seeking his rights under the Act; and
that the courts may enforce the Act by injunction.
None of these acts would seem to deal with the conduct of the
New York truckers' union, and other racketeering unions, except in
the cases where these unions resort to outright violence, which can be
enjoined under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
It seems conceivable that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 18 which
outlaws combinations in restraint of trade and imposes a penalty of treble
damages upon violators of the act, would be an effective weapon for
eliminating these insidious union activities. But in the recent Apex
Hosiery case,' 4 the United States Supreme Court held that labor disputes are not violative of the Sherman Act unless their purpose is to
affect prices or otherwise to destroy free commercial competition in the
open market. This Act is thus obviously emasculated insofar as the
problem under discussion is concerned.
1

Thurman Arnold, Labor's Hidden Holdup Men, Reader's Digest, June, 1941.

1940).
"49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U. S.. C. A. §§151-156 (Supp.
12 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §§201-219 (Supp. 1940).

1-26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §§1-7 (1941).

"' Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 60 Sup. Ct. 982, 84 L. ed.
1311 (1940).
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Obviously the Department of Justice is in need of some weapon
capable of controlling those unions, which, though not using violence,
nevertheless are victimizing the consumer and the public. But for the
present decision, an ideal weapon might be found in the Anti-Racketeering Act, which provides that one who, acting so as to affect trade
or commerce, obtains or attemptt to obtain money or valuable considerations or property belonging to another with his consent, if such
consent is induced by wrongful use of force or fear or threats, is guilty
of a felony. It is submitted that labor unions are just as capable of extortion and racketeering as any other group, and that there is no sound
reason or doctrine that should exclude them from conviction under the
Anti-Racketeering Act when it is proved beyond reasonable doubt in
open court that they are engaging in these practices.
In the first place, it could be urged on good authority that the
instant situation in New York did not involve simply "the payment of
wages by a bona fide employer to a bona fide employee", as was held
in the principle case. Unless the hirer has the right to discharge,
then the worker cannot be considered an "employee". 15 That term
means a person employed to labor for the pleasure or interest of another,
or one employed to render service or assistance in some trade or vocation; one whom the employer retains the right to direct not only as to
what shall be done, but how it shall be done ;16 and one whom the employer has the right to hire, and discharge even short of the completion
of the work. 7 (This is of course subject to the provisions of the
NLRA, that an employer cannot make union activity on the part of a
worker the basis for discharging him, or for refusing to hire him in the
first place.) 8 Furthermore, it has been held that workers who are
guilty of acts of violence against the interests of their employers cannot
be considered as employees either for the purpose of securing reinstatement by the NLRB, or of being considered as members of the
union for the purpose of collective bargaining. 19 It is submitted that
in the light of these holdings the members of the New York truckers'
union cannot be considered as "bona fide employees" of the truck
SLillibridge v. Industrial Accident Com., 4 Cal. App. (2d) 237, 40 P. (2d)
856 (1935); Bernal v. Star Chronicle Pub. Co., 84 S. W. (2d) 429 (Mo. 1935);
Mitchell v. Maytag-Pacific-Intermountain Co., 184 Wash. 342, 51 P. (2d) 393
(1935); RESTATEMENT, AGENcY (1933)

§221.

" Simmons v. Kansas City Jockey Club, 334 Mo. 99, 66 S. W. (2d) 119
(1933).
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Boggs, 66 S. W. (2d) 787 (Tex. 1933).
's Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 61 Sup. Ct. 845,
85 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 753 (1941) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed. 893 (1937); Assodated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 103, 57 Sup. Ct. 650,
81 L. ed. 953 (1936).
"' Standard Lime & Stone Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 97 F. (2d)
531 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
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owners. It is a strange law that would compel a businessman to accept
as his employee and the operator of his expensive machinery and equipment those who have used malicious coercion in foisting themselves
upon him.
A second point is that there is a growing tendency in modern
judicial thought to construe criminal statutes in a manner consistent
with the intent of the legislature, and most conducive to social protection, rather than to follow the old hornbook rule that a criminal statute
is to be construed strictly and in the light most favorable to the accused.2 0
Social protection certainly seems to demand the conviction of the
truckers' union here. Channels of transportation would be totally obstructed if truckers' unions in every town took similar liberties, for a
trucking concern would be forced to pay a day's union wages every time
one of its trucks entered the limits of any city.
Third, Congress believes in the policy that labor and employer should
be on a parity for free and gentlemanly bargaining, as shown by section
1 of the NLRA. It is not intended that either group shall crack the
tyrannical whip over the other.2 1 On this hypothesis, for union operatives to fortify themselves on the public highway and suddenly assault
passing truck drivers, and demand wages for driving the trucks thus
taken over, is obviously nothing short of racketeering. It is certainly
not settlement of labor disputes by parity bargaining.
Still a fourth idea that should be stressed is the quite obvious fact
that labor as a whole is not benefited by most of this pernicious racketeering which certain unions are carrying on. For when the electricians
at the New York World's Fair demanded that all electrical equipment
used be wired and assembled at the Fair grounds rather than in the
home state or factory, 22 the New York electricians were simply depriving other electricians throughout the country of work.23 When certain
20 United States v. Classic, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031, 85 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 867 (1941).
(For discussion of this case, see case comment, page 93, supra); Braffith v.
People, 26 F. (2d) 646 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928); Chapman v. Lake, 112 Fla. 746,
151 So. 399 (1932) ; State ex rel. Kurth v. Grinde, 96 Mont. 608, 32 P. (2d) 15
(1934); People v. Clark, 242 N. Y. 313, 151 N. E. 631 (1926); Thomas v.
State, 40 Okla. Crim. Rep. 204, 267 Pac. 1040 (1928); Wilson v. State, 26
Ohio App. 7, 159 N. E. 585 (1927).
21In Swing v. American Federation of Labor, 372 Ill. 91, 22 N. E. (2d)
857 (1939), rev'd on other grounds, 61 Sup. Ct. 568, 85 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 513
(1940), involving a place of business being picketed because employees themselves unanimously preferred to remain non-union, Justice Shaw said, "The right
of one group to organize for the advancement of its own ends is exactly equal
to but no greater than the right of other citizens peaceably to pursue their own
lawful occupations."
22 Stanley High, Labor in the World of Tomorrow, Reader's Digest, Nov.,
1939.
23 The state of Nevada, according to the authority cited above, withdrew from
the Fair partially because the local electricians' union demanded that its gigantic

electrically operated model of Boulder Dam should be rewired by the localswhich would have involved wrecking the costly model almost entirely.
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musicians' unions fight against non-local musicians performing in their
"territory", 24 musicians in general are the principal sufferers. When
certain unions in Belleville, Illinois and in Cleveland, Ohio, prevent
the use of prefabricated materials, 25 factory workers in general suffer.
The same is true when plumbers in Washington refuse to use pipe
threaded at the factory; and when a Chicago buildings trade council
prohibits the use of stone polished at the quarry in Indiana.2 6 Congress
has granted labor some very strong weapons. Section 1 of the NLRA,
supra, shows that these weapons were intended to be used in removing
labor from the inequitable domination of employers to which it had for
centuries been subjected. There was never any intention that a few
labor groups should turn these weapons upon their fellow workers, and
exploit labor in general for their mere individual gain.
Finally, there is nothing in the wording of the Anti-Racketeering
Act itself that would preclude its use in cleaning up this problem.
At the end of section (d) of the Act is a proviso that "no court of the
United States shall construe or apply any of the provisions of sections
(a) to (e) of this act in such manner as to impair, 6iminish, or in any
manner affect the rights of bona fide labor organizations in lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof, as such rights are expressed
in existing statutes of the United States." However, this would not
prevent using the Act against racketeering unions. The rights of labor
unions as expressed in the existing federal statutes have been sketched
above, and it was seen that nothing therein makes illegal the practices
of "labor's hidden hold-up men". But it is equally obvious, that none
of the labor legislation makes these practices legal. Labor union racketeering has apparently not been considered by Congress, except in the
Anti-Racketeering Act. There have been some suggestions that section
7 of the NLRA, which reads, "Employees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining, or
other mutual aid or protection," would legalize the actions of the New
York truckers' union.27 It is believed that Congress intended by this
section to list certain broad purposes for which labor unions were empowered to strive. It is inherent in this provision that only legal means
of obtaining these purposes shall be used. It is believed, as pointed out,
that the methods of the racketeering unions are not legal means of obtaining the purposes of collective bargaining, mutual aid, and protection.
, Stanley High, Labor in the World of Tomorrow, Reader's Digest, Nov.,
1939.
" Thurman Arnold, Labor's Hidden Holdup Men, Reader's Digest, June, 1941.

207 Ibid.
Note (1941) 54 HARv. L. REv. 1400.
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Therefore it is submitted that section 7 of the NLRA would not preclude
the use of the Anti-Racketeering Act against racketeering unions.
For these various reasons it is believed that the appeal of the principal case now pending before the United States Supreme Court 28
may be successful. However, in the event that a reversal of this decision is not obtained, it is submitted that Congress should amend the
Anti-Racketeering Act, perhaps by tacking a proviso onto the proviso
to section (d), supra, which might read, "provided further, that nothing in this proviso, or anywhere else in this act, shall be construed as
exempting any labor organization from the terms of this act when such
organization is using or attempting to use or threatening to use coercion
for the purpose of obtaining anyone's consent to the taking of his
valuable considerations or other properties and rights as set out in sections (a) and (b) of this act, or for the purpose of taking such considerations, properties, and rights without the owner's consent."
MILTON SHORT.

Public Officials-Liability for Breach of Statutory Duty
In an action by a town against all members of its board of aldermen, with the exception of the mayor, the complaint alleged that the
mayor, as tax collector and waterworks superintendent, had been able
to embezzle funds of the town because of the negligent breach of statutory duties on the part of the aldermen; i.e., to require a bond of the
mayor and periodic accountings by him. However, since neither a
corrupt or malicious motive nor any statutory provision for personal
liability was alleged, a 'demurrer to the complaint was sustained and later
affirmed on appeal.' In a companion case, by the same town against
the same aldermen, with the exception of one of their number whom
they had elected chief of police during the time he was serving as alderman, the complaint alleged the violation of a statute forbidding a public
officer to hold more than one office, and a consequent loss to the town
in the amount of the salary paid to the chief of police. Likewise, demurrer to this complaint was sustained and later affirmed because of
the failure of the complaint to allege corrupt motive or a statutory
provision for liability. 2

Thus in both of these civil actions against

public officers for negligent breach of non-discretionary duties, the court
takes the view that a corrupt motive or a statutory provision for liability
is necessary to the statement of a cause of action.
These cases involve breaches of duty by public officers. The courts
of this state have had occasion to consider these basic facts in several
" Announcement of the granting of this certiorari was made October 13, 1941.
'Town of Old Fort v. Harmon, 219 N. C. 241, 13 S. E. (2d) 423 (1941).
'Town of Old Fort v. Harmon, 219 N. C. 245, 13 S. E. (2d) 426 (1941).
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variations, and in doing so they have made distinctions as to the liability
attaching thereto.
The most prominent distinctions are (1) that between ministerial or
non-discretionary and quasi-judicial or discretionary duties, and (2)
that between the motives with which duties are violated, i.e., whether
the officer is (a) merely careless, mistaken, or negligent, or (b) corrupt
or malicious.
The courts of this state have never questioned the proposition that
officers are free from both civil3 and criminal4 liability when they have
negligently, carelessly, or mistakenly breached a discretionary duty provided they acted with good faith and without corrupt or malicious
motive.5 On the other hand it is almost as clear that where an officer
has corruptly or maliciously abused his discretion he is liable both
civilly and criminally.8
In the case of a negligent breach of ministerial or non-discretionary
duties, it is well settled in this state that public officers are not individually liable in a civil suit in absence of express statutory provision
for such liability.7 Where there is a statutory duty, a distinction is sometimes made between duties imposed for the benefit of an individual and
those imposed for the benefit and protection of the general public, which
is all a matter of construction of the statute.8 In the former instance
the person to whom the duty is owed has sometimes been allowed recovery for injuries sustained by an officer's breach of duty, 9 but in the
latter instance the general rule is that even though an individual has
suffered loss he cannot recover from the negligent public officer.' 0
Moye v. McLawhorn, 208 N. C. 812, 182 S. E. 493 (1935) ; Hipp v. Farrell,

173 N. C. 167, 91 S. E. 831, (1917) ; Templeton v. Beard, 159 N. C. 63, 74 S. E.
735 (1912) ; Hannan v. Grizzard, 99 N. C. 161, 6 S. E. 93 (1888).
"State v. Powers, 75 N. C. 281 (1876); State v. Williams, 34 N. C. 172
(1851).
Notes (1926) 40 A. L. R. 1358, (1928) 53 A. L. R. 381 (personal liability
of municipal officer or employee for negligence in performance of duty).
c State v. Glasgow, 1 N. C. 264 (1800)
(the Secretary of State was found
guilty of issuing land warrants which he knew were valueless) 1 Moore v. Lambeth, 207 N. C. 23, 175 N. C. 714 (1934) (the city councillors of Charlotte in a
civil action were held personally liable to the taxpayers for wrongfully, willfully,
and knowingly disbursing public funds without adequate consideration moving
to the city).
"Noland v. Board of Trustees of Southern Pines School, 190 N. C. 250,
129 S. E. 577 (1925); Fore v. Feimster, 171 N. C. 551, 88 S. E. 977 (1916);
Hudson v. McArthur, 152 N. C. 445, 67 S. E. 995 (1910); see Hipp v. Farrell,
173 N. C. 167, 169, 91 S. E. 831, 832 (1917) ; Templeton v. Beard, 159 N. C. 63,
65, 74 S. E. 735, 736 (1912).
'See Hipp v. Farrell, 173 N. C. 167, 170, 91 S. E. 831, 833 (1917) ; Hudson
v. McArthur, 152 N. C. 445, 450, 67 S. E. 995, 997 (1910).
' Amy v. Barkholder, 78 U. S. 136, 20 Law. Ed. 101 (1871); Holt v. McLean, 75 N. C. 347 (1876); see Hipp v. Farrell, 173 N. C. 167, 170, 91 S. E.
831, 833 (1917); Hudson v. McArthur, 152 N. C. 445, 450, 67 S. E. 995, 997
(1910).
10 Hudson v. McArthur, 152 N. C. 445, 67 S. E. 995 (1910).
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Brown, J., dissenting with Walker, J., criticizes the latter proposition
in Hudson v. McArthur," a case in which the majority of the court
held that county commissioners were not civilly liable to sureties who
had been forced to pay on a sheriff's bond because of the sheriff's
embezzlement of tax receipts. There it was contended by the sureties
that this result would not have been possible had the county commissioners performed their statutory duty and taken up the tax receipts at
the erd of the sheriff's first term. Brown argues,' 2 however, that they
should be held liable to the sureties, rationale being that a duty to the
individual plaintiff is not necessary, but rather, direct injury to some
special interest of plaintiff is sufficient, even though the main purpose
of the imposition of the duty was the protection of the public, and even
though a failure in performance is also a penal offense.
1 3
However, the decision in Hipp v. Farrell
distinguishes between
the personal liability of those who have both administrative and discretionary duties, as county commissioners and aldermen, and those
officers who carry out solely administrative duties, as subordinate officers
in physical charge of work, declaring that the latter should be personally
liable for the negligent failure to perform his duty even in the absence
of a provision imposing such liability.' 4 Whether there is valid ground
for this distinction is at least open to question since there seems to be
just as much reason for holding an alderman to a personal responsibility
as there is for holding an administrative officer such as a road overseer.
On the other hand, a public officer is criminally liable for the negligent breach of a ministerial duty even in the absence of statute.' 5 State
v. Haywood' 6 involved the indictment of city commissioners for negligent failure to keep the streets in repair as they were "empowered and
required" to do by statute. This statutory duty was held to be nondiscretionary and the commissioners were held criminally liable, the
court saying there that "whenever a duty is imposed by law, the performance of which concerns the public, the omission to perform it is an
indictable offence." Although this language is broad enough to include
discretionary duties, the decision is authority only for the rule that
negligent breach of a ministerial duty creates criminal responsibility.
In the case of corrupt or malicious dereliction of a ministerial duty,
as in the corresponding breach of a discretionary duty, the officer is
liable both civilly and criminally.'1
11

Ibid.
id. at 452, 67 S. E. 995, 998 (dissent).
Hipp v. Farrell, 173 N. C. 167, 169, 91 S. E. 831, 832 (1917).

12See
"3See

"See Hathaway v. Hinton, 46 N. C. 243, 247 (1853).
" State v. Commissioners of Fayetteville, 4 N. C. 419 (1816).
"0State v. Haywood, 48 N. C. 399 (1856).
'See State v. Powers, 75 N. C. 281, 284 (1876).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

However, where there are statutory provisions which make negligent breach of ministerial duties a misdemeanor or which impose a
penalty, the courts do not hesitate to enforce them. The trouble is that
the legislature has failed to enact enough of these provisions, with the
result that the courts are forced to fall back upon the previously. discussed general principles which apply in absence of statute. It is submitted that these principles are sometimes inadequate, not only in failing
to keep public officers in line, but also in failing to provide an adequate
remedy for the individual who suffers from the breach of duty.
Nevertheless, in North Carolina there are a number of statutes imposing various types of liability for the breach of the several kinds of
duties, but because of the various effects given these statutes by the
courts, it is necessary to look to the cases construing each of them in
order to learn their full significance.
Where a statute' 8 makes it a misdemeanor for officers named therein
to fail to perform the duties prescribed, State v. Foy19 confined the
operation of the statute to ministerial duties.
Another statute 20 creates two offenses and penalties: (1) The willful omission, neglect, or refusal to discharge the duties of an office,
which is punishable by fine and imprisonment. (2) The willful and
corrupt action of an officer, which is punishable by removal as well as
fine and imprisonment. State v. Hatch2 ' makes county commissioners
criminally liable under the first section for selling shingles worth $70.00
at the "grossly inadequate" price of $21.00 without making reasonable
efforts to drive a better bargain. The court begins by saying that "the
first offence is for negligence, or other misconduct in official duties,
without corrupt intent, and is simple malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance." In another part of the opinion, the court says that the
indictment under the first clause of the act lies against officers for willful neglect of duty, not mere mistakes of judgment. Finally, no error
is found in the trial judge's charge that a negligent and willful breach
of duty or abuse of discretion was necessary for conviction. The
opinion, taken as a whole and in connection with the facts on which it
is based, seems to indicate that negligence in the performance of discretionary duties so extreme as to warrant an inference of willfulness
constitutes a misdemeanor under the first section, although the language
used does not exclude the possibility that ordinary negligence should be'
enough.
In our statutes there are examples of general provisions which im"IN. C. Code (1883)N. §765.
C. 744, 3 S. E. 524 (1887).
19 State v. Foy, 99
C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1939) §4384.
S°N. C. Code (1883) §1090; compare N.
21 State v. Hatch, 116 N. C. 1003, 21 S. E. 430 (1895).
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pose liability upon certain classes of officers for breach of "duty". One
of these is C. S. 130222 which reads "any [county] commissioner who
shall neglect to perform any duty required of him by law, as a member
of the board, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall also be liable
to a penalty of $200.00 for each offence, to be paid to any person who
shall sue for the same", but in a civil action 23 to recover the penalty
imposed by this section, it was held that defendant's failure to construct
a draw in a bridge, as required of him by another statute, did not render
him liable for the penalty. The statute alleged to be violated required
draws only when necessary; hence, the duty was discretionary, and this
section is held to apply to breach of discretionary duties only when
willfulness or gross carelessness is involved. In another case, 24 one,
but only one, penalty was allowed under this statute where defendant
commissioner failed to perform his ministerial duty and remove a sheriff
when the latter failed to renew his bond or report collections.
Other statutes provide liability for the breach of a particular duty.20
For example, C. S. 33526 provides that county commissioners who knowingly approve an insufficient bond shall be liable as sureties thereon. In
Moffitt v. Dav'is2 7 this provision is construed as applicable in the case
of a failure to take a bond in the first instance. Here the language of
the court indicates the complex predicament in which they find themselves when liability for the breach of a statutory duty is inadequately
defined, and the rusulting necessity for reading into the statute the
measure of liability commensurate with the breach of the duty which it
28
sets forth.
ARTHUR C. JONES, JR.

'282 N. C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1939) §1302.
Staton v. Wimberly, 122 N. C. 107, 29 S.
4

E. 63 (1898).
Bray v. Barnard, 109 N. C. 44. 13 S. E. 729 (1891).
'. C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1939) §1301 (having been on the books since
1869 or 1870 and making a county commissioner who approves a bond he knows
or has reason to believe is insufficient in sum or security guilty of a misdemeanor,
liable to removal, and permanently disqualified from state office).
"6N. C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1939) §335.
27
Moffitt v. Davis, 205 N. C. 565, 1721 S. E. 317 (1933).
28All cases require that defendant's breach of duty be the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury or loss. Ellis v. Brown, 217 N. C. 787, 9 S. E. (2d) 467 (1940).
What might almost be called an eagerness not to imposi liability on public officers
seems to have led the courts in many cases to hold that no proximate cause
exists. For example, the court in the first principal case held proximate cause
not to exist. See Town of Old Fort v. Harmon, 219 N. C. 241, 245, 13 S. E.
(2d) 423, 426 (1941). However, if bond had been required the town would have
suffered no loss, and, furthermore, a reasonable man could have foreseen that
loss might occur where no bond was exacted and no periodic accountings were
required of a tax collector.

